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DO POLITICAL INSTABILITY, TERRORISM, AND CORRUPTION HAVE
DETERRING EFFECTS ON TOURISM DEVELOPMENT EVEN IN THE
PRESENCE OF UNESCO HERITAGE? A CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL ESTIMATE

GHIALY YAP AND SHRABANI SAHA
School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Faculty of Business and Law,
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup, WA, Australia

This article evaluates the effects of political instability, terrorism, and corruption on tourism development, particularly UNESCO-listed heritage destinations. Using a fixed-effects panel data analysis for
139 countries over the period 1999–2009, the result reveals that a one-unit increase in political instability decreases tourist arrivals and tourism revenue between 24% and 31% and 30% and 36%, respectively. Furthermore, in the presence of heritage, terrorism has negative effects on tourism demand
even though its effect is lower than that of political instability. However, the study shows that an
increase in corruption index would not have an adverse influence on tourist arrival numbers, particularly for those countries that have historical and natural heritage. Perhaps, many experienced travelers
have expectations that they would require paying bribes to corrupt authorities for travel visa or permits
to some tourist destinations in order to make things accessible. Moderation effect results indicate that
political instability reduces tourism demand even in UNESCO-listed heritage destinations.
Key words: Political instability; Corruption; Tourism; Panel data analysis

Introduction

Tourism Organization, 2006). For those developing
countries that have abundant labor supply, tourism is
considered as an industry that can alleviate poverty
and create jobs to financially support the poor.
Nevertheless, similar to any business, tourism
is considerably sensitive to political environment.
When a country experiences stable governance and
sound political system, it encourages more national
and foreign investments in physical buildings

For most countries, particularly developing
economies, tourism plays an important role in generating employment opportunities and revenues.
Because tourism is a labor-intensive industry, many
job activities are related to the supply chain of the sector such as food delivery services, production and sale
of handicrafts, recreational activities, and construction of tourism infrastructures (United Nations World
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(i.e., hotels and infrastructures) and in services (i.e.,
marketing campaign and security). Such tourism
investment not only promotes the country’s economic growth but can also create a positive destination’s image as a safe and comfortable place
to travel. Hall and O’Sullivan (1996) quoted that
“issues of political stability and political relations
within and between states are extremely important
in determining the image of destinations in touristgenerating regions and . . . the real and perceived
safety of tourists” (p. 105). When a country experiences political upheaval and terrorist-related incidence, potential tourists may be warned not to visit
the country and that could significantly affect its
tourism industry. Although most studies would prob
ably agree that political instability and terrorism
discourage the tourism industry, the magnitude of
these effects looking at the UNESCO’s listed heritage countries has yet to be measured. In order to
fill this gap, we evaluate the impacts using wellknown and widely used political risk data from
International Country Risk Guide for the period
1999–2009.
Like political instability and terrorism, corruption
can adversely affect a country’s tourism industry as
revealed by the tourism literature (Das & Dirienzo,
2010; Lau & Hazari, 2011). Das and Dirienzo
(2010) argued that if a country practices bribery and
fraudulent business practice, this can deteriorate its
social and cultural image and impede its tourism
competitiveness. Moreover, political inconsistency
arising from the constant change of governments
could raise the cost of doing business in corrupted
countries and generate barriers for investments in
tourism (Tosun & Timothy, 2001). A politically corrupt nation can indirectly exacerbate public turmoil
when conflicts between corrupt politicians and the
people of the country and/or opposition political
parties become intense. One of the recent incidents
is the ousting of Egypt’s former regime in 2011
where the incident witnessed days of blood demonstrations and chaos (Lagi, Bertrand, & Bar-Yam,
2011). Even though the country’s political revolution is currently over, Euromonitor (2011) projected
that its tourist arrival number is predicted to decline
by 2% in 2012 as potential tourists are still wary of
traveling to Egypt.
The literature suggests that political instability
has adverse effects on tourism (e.g., Issa & Altinay,

2006; Neumayer, 2004; Sönmez, 1998); however,
whether terrorism and corruption will affect tourists’ decisions to travel still remains puzzling.
Tourists in modern days would prefer new travel
experience particularly to those Third World destinations that may have considerably high level of
corruption but may not necessarily be politically
unstable. Mowforth and Munt (2009) found that
between 2000 and 2004, the number of tourist arrivals to African, Asia Pacific, and Middle East countries increased by 4.4%, 6.9%, and 9.5% per annum,
respectively, whereas the annual growth rate of
tourist arrivals to European and American countries
was just 2.7% and -0.5%, respectively (pp. 93–94).
They asserted that the new global travel patterns can
be related to the rising middle class in the middleincome economies and the attractive travel package
offered by these Third World destinations with good
value for money. Also, perhaps the modern tourists
prefer destinations that can offer more prestigious
tourism products (i.e., UNESCO heritage).
Figure 1 illustrates the average political instability and corruption indices as well as the tourism growth rate from 1999 to 2009 and presents
some interesting findings. Highly corrupt and
terrorist-prone countries have a relatively high level
of tourist growth rate. For instance, tourist arrivals to Uganda grew approximately by 17% annually between 1999 and 2009 despite the country’s
high corruption and terrorism indices. Similarly,
India is classified as one of the most corrupt countries; but its tourist number grew by 7.9% yearly.
In contrast, those countries that are relatively stable
and less corrupt tend to have low tourism growth.
For example, Switzerland is considered as one of
the safest countries in the world with low levels
of political instability, terrorism, and corruption;
however, its tourism was recorded at merely 1.2%
annual growth during 1999 and 2009. Therefore,
on the basis of the above arguments, could a tourist choose a travel destination depending more on
tourism products and less on the destination’s political environment or both?
In addressing the inquiry into the impact of
political instability, terrorism, and corruption on
tourism, with a few exceptions, the majority of the
empirical studies have examined various country
and/or regional case studies but cross-sectional
comparative analysis has been lacking (such as
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Figure 1. Political instability, corruption, terrorism, and tourism growth (average between 1999 and 2009)
for selected countries. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Euromonitor.

Hoti, McAleer, & Shareef, 2005; Narayan, 2005;
Neumayer, 2004). Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no single empirical study that
investigates the impact of political instability, terrorism, and corruption on tourism demand in the
presence of historical and natural heritage. Garrod
and Fyall (2000) asserted that a country’s heritage
has a highly economic potential for generating tourism revenue and sustaining the industry. Hence, our
research question is whether those destinations that
have world-renowned heritage are able to attract
tourists even in the presence of political instability. While examining the issue we employed panel
data analysis because it combines cross-sectional
and time-series data and can produce more reliable
estimates (Baltagi, 2008).
The main contribution of this article is to distinguish the effects of political risks on tourism
development especially in those vulnerable UNESCOlisted heritage destinations. It aims to provide a
projection of the costs of political instability, terrorism, and corruption on tourism demand for these
destinations. Furthermore, the key motivation of
modeling tourism demand is to determine business

profitability, and hence, estimates of expected future
demand constitute an important element in all planning of tourism activities particularly for perishable
tourism products (Song & Witt, 2006). Therefore,
it is crucial that a demand model should incorporate
political risk indicators that evidently play a significant influence on tourism businesses (e.g., Hoti,
McAleer, & Shareef, 2007; Neumayer, 2004), especially in countries that contain UNESCO-listed heritage. The model not only aims to generate accurate
tourism forecasts but also to give correct estimations
of the long-term financial commitments to rebuild
and sustain heritage tourism in highly political
unstable countries.
Political Instability, Corruption, and
Heritage Tourism: A Brief Overview
Political instability can be viewed in three perspectives. First, it is the propensity for regime or
government change; second, it can be related to the
political upheaval or violence in a society; and third,
it focuses on instability in government policies
that are subject to frequent changes (Darity, 2008,
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pp. 304–306). Political instability can be related to
terrorism, riots, and wars (Sönmez, 1998), and its
effects can deter a country’s tourism growth. Politically unstable countries constantly encounter challenges such as withdrawal of foreign investments
and negative public image when the governments
try to implement tourism planning strategies (Issa &
Altinay, 2006).
The existing literature of political crises has
shown evidence that political instability can hinder tourism development and damage economic
growth. When a regime is being challenged for
its political legitimacy from outside the political
system, the intensity of the challenge would rise
and provoke public violence and turmoil if the
government fails to implement mutual resolutions
(Neumayer, 2004). Hall and O’Sullivan (1996)
argued that prolonged political unrests can negatively influence tourists’ perceptions on the affected
destinations and that would discourage potential
tourists to visit the countries as well as its neighboring regions (p. 105). Moreover, they asserted that if
a country experiences a military coup or warfare,
military activities can destroy tourist infrastructure
and limit tourists’ comfort and convenience in traveling (Hall & O’Sullivan, 1996, p. 108). With the
decline in tourist numbers in a politically problematic country, investments on the tourism industry
will be affected and there is a tendency for the government to divert tourism investment resources to
fund military activities.
Terrorism can be categorized in two ways. First,
political instability can lead to terrorism when a civil
society is denied the freedom of expressing political discontent, leading the society to exert political
pressure against the government and make terrorism more likely (Munson, 2008). Second, a country
that experiences terrorist attacks may not necessarily relate to home politics. Franks (2009) argued that
some cases of terrorism threats can originate from
al-Qaeda-type organizations that have no direct relation with those affected countries. Tourists’ safety is
always vulnerable to terrorist-related incidents and
internal conflicts in host countries. In the tourism literature, most empirical research reveals that tourism
is susceptible to terrorism acts, particularly if terrorist attacks happen in developing countries (Baker &
Coulter, 2007; Bhattarai, Conway, & Shrestha, 2005;
Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Yaya, 2009).

Furthermore, Pizam and Fleischer (2002) asserted
that if a destination suffers from frequent terrorist
attacks, its number of international tourist arrivals
will constantly decline until its tourism industry
eventually reaches a standstill.
However, political events such as a coup and internal political problems have far more severe impacts
on tourism activity than one-off terrorist attack incidents (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008). Similarly,
Neumayer (2004) found that a substantial increase
in terrorist events lowers tourist arrivals by 8.8%;
however, a substantial increase in human rights violation reduces tourist arrivals by 32%. In conclusion,
the literature suggests that political conflict events
have more severe impacts on tourism than terrorist
attack incidents.
In relation to public sector corruption, it can be a
barrier to tourism development. Duffy (2000) argued
that the corrupt governments have the wealth, status,
or power to intervene in tourism projects and allocate resources that could render benefits to them personally. He further justified that these governments
may allow illegitimate foreign investment in tourism
developments; that is, hotels and tourism shops may
be used for drug trade and money laundering.
Tourism policy makers of a country play an important role in developing regulations to ensure tourists’
security and stability through control over resource
mobility, intervention in development of local and
regional areas, and provision of a legal framework for
production, environmental, and consumer protection
(Williams, 2004). Nevertheless, in a corrupt country,
the authorities often breach the country’s tourism
development policies with detrimental impact. For
example, the Kenyan government failed to deal with
environmental issues effectively and cooperate with
local communities due to political corruption and
constant changes in leadership, ensuing in a serious
decline in ecotourism in the country (African Centre for Technology Studies [ACTS], 1998; Ikiara &
Okech, 2002).
Nevertheless, the existing literature of corruption and tourism demand reveals some mixed conclusions. On one hand, even though Lau and Hazari
(2011) agreed that corruption can have negative
impacts on tourism, they found that their estimation
results are inconsistent with the theory. The corruption coefficients were estimated to be between 0.093
and 0.112, suggesting that an increase in corruption
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perception index will not have adverse effects on
tourism development. On the other hand, Das and
Dirienzo (2010) found that a reduction in corruption levels generate positive impacts on the level of
tourism competitiveness across nations. In fact, a
decline in corruption level for developing countries
increases their competitiveness greater than that for
developed countries.
According to Southall and Robinson (2011), heritage tourism is defined as “visits to and experiences
of places of historical importance and significance”
(p. 177). It provides opportunities to visitors to
reveal a country’s identity and a symbol of national
pride. Organizations such as UNESCO play an
important role in promoting destination images and
sustaining national inheritance. It seeks to encourage the identification, protection, and preservation
of cultural and natural heritage globally, which are
considered to have significant value to humanity
(UNESCO, 2013).
Nevertheless, many of these treasures are susceptible to damage or destruction due to wars, constant terrorist attacks, and political riots. In fact,
the restoration of these national heritages requires
long-term planning and can be costly. Nuryanti
(1996) claimed that developing countries face great
challenges, particularly related to limited funding
resources and management problems. Furthermore,
Chheang (2008) argued that a developing country
such as Cambodia had ruined its national treasures
due to external intervention, French colonialism,
and civil war. Unfortunately, despite the end of civil
unrest in 1991, Chheang stressed that Cambodia’s
tourism remains underdeveloped due to corruption.
As incidents of political upheaval and public corruption are mostly evident in developing countries,
it is no doubt that heritage sites can be at risk of
ruin. Hence, tourism officials in those politically
uncertain countries should not only implement
policies to preserve and protect heritage, they also
need to impose appropriate crisis management to
avoid the disappearance of heritage tourism.

advantageous because such data provide more information, more variability, less collinearity among the
variables, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2008).
To our best knowledge, there are two empirical
papers that have conducted investigations on political instability and corruption effects on tourism,
respectively. The first is that of Neumayer (2004),
who conducted an empirical investigation regarding political instability impacts on tourism using
fixed effects and a dynamic generalized method
of moments panel data models.1 The second by
Lau and Hazari (2011) explored the relationship
between corruption and tourism using panel ordinary least squares. Unlike the previous studies,
the current article aims to develop an econometric model that quantifies the effects of political
risk, terrorist threat, and corruption on tourism by
controlling various economic variables. The new
model is designed in such a way that it can avoid
any omitted variable bias and can be used to generate reliable forecasts.
The current research is distinct from the data and
models proposed by Neumayer (2004). In our study,
we first identify political risk variables [i.e., internal
conflicts (IC), government stability (GS), religion in
politics (RP), ethnic tensions (ET), external conflicts
(EC), and military in politics (MP)] that have significant influences on tourism demand data, which can
then be used to create a composite index for political
instability. Table 1 presents the description of political risk variables that are used in this study. Second,
we incorporate historical and natural heritage in the
model. Third, we extend and update the number of
countries and period of analysis from previous study.
Finally, we estimate the moderation effect of political instability and heritage to examine the role of
UNESCO-listed heritage destinations in promoting
the tourism industry.
We estimate the relationship between each political risk variable and tourism demand by using the
following model:

Data and Methodology

ln TDit = d0 + d1Xit + eit

In this article, we examine the impact of political
instability on tourism demand by employing a fixedeffects panel data analysis for 139 countries over
the period 1999–2009. The panel data models are

where i = country; t = time; TD = tourism demand;
ln = natural logarithm; X = the political risk indicator which can be taken as IC, GS, RP, EC, ET, MP,
CORR or TERROR; dk = estimated coefficients for

(1)
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Table 1
Description of Political Risk Variables
Notation

Variable name

Description

GS

Government stability

IC

Internal conflict

EC

External conflict

CORR

Corruption

MP

Military in politics

RP

Religion in politics

ET

Ethnic tensions

TERROR

Terrorism

The variable presents the government’s capability of carrying out its declared programs
and its ability to stay in office. Its subcomponents include government unity, legislative strength, and popular support.
It assesses political violence in a country and its actual or potential impact on governance.
The variable consists of two subcomponents: civil war/coup threat and civil disorder.
It measures the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action (i.e., diplomatic
pressures, territorial disputes) and violent external pressure such as cross-border conflicts and war. Three subcomponents are included in the variable: war, cross-border
conflict, and foreign pressures.
This variable assesses corruption within the government, including excessive patronage,
nepotism, job reservation, favor for favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously
close ties between politics and business.
It predicts the degree of military involvement in a government or the possibility of
military takeover an elected government.
The variable measures the extent of single religious group dominating governance and
the suppression of religious freedom.
The component assesses the degree of tensions due to racial, nationality, or language
divisions. In particular, it provides an index regarding the degree of tolerant level and
willingness to compromise by opposition group.
This variable is separated from internal conflict so that we can examine how terrorism
can negatively impact on tourism demand. It is an index that presents the perceptions
of terrorist incidents in a country and whether terrorism is related to the country’s
political violence.

Note: The description of the data is summarized and extracted from the PRS Group websites. For more detailed information,
see http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.

k = 0, 1,...,9, and eit = error term. All political risk
data are extracted from the International Country Risk Guide provided by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group. The data are constructed on the
basis of point scores, which indicate that high (low)
scores mean high (low) risk.2 For tourism demand
data, we employ the number of tourist arrivals and
tourism revenue earned in each country i, which are
extracted from Euromonitor International. Based on
the Equation 1, the expected sign of d1 is negative,
implying that the higher number of political unrest
incidents in a country can cause serious decline in
tourism demand.
Next, we extend Equation 1 by including countryspecific and economics variables, as shown in the
following equation:
lnTDit = d0 + d1Xit + d2H + d3N +
d4 ln Yit + d5 ln CEXCit +
d6IEXCit + d7 ln ATTit + eit

(2)

where X = variables for political instability, corruption or terrorism; H = country dummy variable for
world historical heritage approved by UNESCO;

N = country dummy variable for world natural wonders approved by UNESCO; Y = real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; CEXC = changes in
real exchange rates; IEXC = initial exchange rate;
ATT = an indicator of tourist attractions. The model
uses income and exchange rate indicators as the
control variables. The income proxy variable is
real GDP per capita, which measures the minimum
income level that tourists could afford to travel to
the country. It also represents a country’s living standards and economic performance as an indication
of the government’s affordability to invest, build,
and maintain infrastructures for tourism. Given the
points above, we expect that the income coefficient
sign should be positive. Changes in real exchange
rates is the proxy variable for tourism price, which
reflects the relative prices between origin and foreign countries (Lim, 2006). It is measured in national
currency units per US dollar and adjusted by purchasing power parity, and the original real exchange
rates are transformed into first difference data to
avoid nonstationary issues. The expected sign for
CEXC is positive. Furthermore, we adopt the initial exchange rate variable to distinguish countries
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that have high and low domestic currency values.
The rational of using IEXC is to examine whether a
country’s strong currency could have adverse effects
on its tourism competitiveness. We anticipate that if
a country has a strong currency at the beginning,
there is a tendency that the travel cost to the country is expensive and potential tourists would choose
other destinations that can offer them cheaper deals
and better value for money. Hence, the expected sign
for IEXC coefficient will be negative. All income
and exchange rate data are extracted from the Penn
World Table. Our research includes country-specific
variables such as tourist attractions, which measure
a country’s tourism revenues to visitors’ sites, and
permanent attractions such as art galleries, museums, casinos, and national parks. The data are provided by Euromonitor. The descriptive statistics for
all variables can be found in the Appendix.
Finally, we examine the relationship between
political instability and tourism demand in
UNESCO’s heritage countries using the interaction
term of Xit and heritage dummy (H or N). For example, using the historical heritage dummy variable
(H), Equation 3 is structured as follows:
ln TDit = d0 + d1Xit + d2H + d3Xit × H +
d4 ln Yit + d5 ln CEXCit +
d6IEXCit + d7 ln ATTit + eit

(3)

Differentiating Equation 3 with respect to Xit
shows the marginal impact of political instability
as:
¶ ln TDi,t
= d1 + d 3 H
¶ X i ,t

(4)

A similar process applies to the N variable. The
interaction coefficient (d3)between Xit and lnTDit
shows the relationship between political instability
and tourism demand for countries that possess historical or natural heritage. The coefficient suggests
that Xit decreases TD in historical heritage countries
even though the impact is less compared to that of
the nonheritage countries. We expect d3 > 0 and
(d1 + d3) < 0.
Empirical Results
This section analyzes the empirical results of
the impact of political instability, terrorism, and
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corruption on tourism demand. The first part of
the analysis focuses on the relationship between
political instability (both individual and composite
index), terrorism, and corruption with tourist arrival
and tourism revenue only. The second part analyzes
the effects after controlling several economic factors and with and without heritage variables by utilizing panel fixed effects.
How much do political instability, terrorism,
and corruption matter for the tourism industry? To
quantify this, we begin the analysis by estimating
the impact of individual and composite indices of
political instability and corruption index without
controls on tourist arrival (TA) and tourism revenue
(TR). The results are reported in Table 2, suggesting
that except for government stability (GS), all other
individual as well as composite indices of political instability have negative and significant effects
on TA and TR. For example, a one-unit increase in
composite political instability index reduces TA and
TR by 50% and 56%, respectively. In other words,
a higher political instability reduces tourist arrival
and tourism revenue significantly and the magnitudes are considerable. In terms of individual components of political instability, internal conflict (IC),
external conflict (EC), military in politics (MP),
and ethnic tension (ET) play crucial roles in reducing tourist arrival and tourism revenue. Terrorism
(TERROR) and corruption (CORR) also illustrate
similar effects. A one-unit increase in TERROR
and CORR reduces tourist arrivals by 16% and
35%, respectively. Interestingly, terrorism has less
impact than political instability and corruption as
the responses of composite political instability and
corruption are elastic. The rest of the analysis measures the impact on tourism development by using
composite political instability index.
The next step estimates the impact of political
instability, terrorism, and corruption on tourism
development using panel period fixed-effect estimations after incorporating the standard economic
controls in the tourism literature for 139 countries
for the period 1999–2009. The results are reported
in Table 3. The coefficient for political instability
is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that higher political instability reduces tourist
arrivals (TA) in a country. A one-unit increase in
political instability decreases tourist arrivals by
24% when there is no heritage dummy variable;
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Table 2
Estimates and Elasticities of Political Instability Variables on Tourism Demand
Estimates
Variables
Composite of political instability (PI)
Terrorism (TERROR)
Government stability (GS)
Internal conflicts (IC)
External conflicts (EC)
Military in politics (MP)
Religion in politics (RP)
Ethnics tension (ET)
Corruption (CORR)

Elasticity

ln(TA)

ln(TR)

TA

TR

-0.695***
(-0.058)
-0.178***
(-0.031)
-0.034
(-0.032)
-0.734***
(-0.037)
-0.425***
(-0.024)
-0.403***
(-0.003)
-0.194***
(-0.01)
-0.304***
(-0.008)
-0.43***
(-0.008)

-0.826***
(-0.062)
-0.162***
(-0.036)
-0.034
(-0.05)
-0.834***
(-0.05)
-0.614***
(-0.061)
-0.496***
(-0.011)
-0.187***
(-0.012)
-0.379***
(-0.012)
-0.558***
(-0.011)

-2.313

-2.749

-0.598

-0.544

-0.117

-0.117

-2.003

-2.276

-1.064

-1.537

-1.666

-2.05

-0.606

-0.584

-1.222

-1.523

-2.634

-3.419

Note: TA, tourist arrival numbers; TR, tourism receipts. ln denotes natural logarithm. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*** denotes significance at the 1% critical level. The elasticity value is derived as follows: For example, 0 where a and b are estid TA
mates. The first-order differentiation yields
= bTA. Using the differentiation equation and including PI and TA variables,
d PI
PI d TA
×
= bPI. The mean of PI is used to calculate the elasticity value.
the elasticity equation is E =
TA d PI

but it reduces further in the presence of historical
and natural heritage (31%). Likewise, the political
instability coefficient retains the negative sign and
the significance level when tourism revenue (TR)
is used as the dependent variable. We found similar results when tourism revenue as a percentage of
GDP is used; however, the results are not reported
here due to space limitation. This result supports
the £2.5 billion decline in tourism revenue in Egypt
together with a 32% decrease in tourist arrivals to
the region since the revolution erupted on January
25, 2011 (Shenker, 2012).
Likewise, the coefficient for CORR is negative
and significant for the tourist arrivals as the dependent variable, suggesting that a high level of corruption reduces tourist arrivals significantly. The result
is consistent with Lau and Hazari (2011) and Das
and Dirienzo (2010). However, the effect becomes
positive when heritage variables are included in the
estimation. This result illustrates that an increase in

corruption level would not have adverse influence
on tourist arrival numbers, particularly for those
countries that have historical and natural heritage.
Perhaps, many experienced travelers have expectations that they would require paying bribes to corrupt authorities for travel visa or permits to some
tourist destinations in order to make things accessible. For example, some tourist places or activities
are restricted by the authorities in terms of available
hours and numbers of tourists per day, which can be
surmounted by paying bribes to the corrupt officials.
Moreover, some tourist destinations require government approvals to enter into the spot, and bribing
government officials can make things accessible.
However, the corruption coefficient becomes negative and significant when TR is used as the dependent variable. Overall, the impact of corruption
shows some interesting results on tourism demand.
A higher level of corruption in a country might
not indicate that the country’s tourist numbers will

1364
137

0.314***
(0.028)
-0.059***
(0.003)
0.238**
(0.099)
0.292***
(0.005)
4.212***
(0.309)
0.633
0.000

-0.214***
(0.025)

-0.034***
(0.012)

1364
137

1217
136

0.398***
0.395***
(0.024)
(0.013)
-0.068*** -0.067***
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.231**
0.273**
(0.125)
(0.117)
0.291***
0.296***
(0.004)
(0.005)
3.013***
2.937***
(0.310)
(0.106)
0.624
0.624
0.000
0.000

-0.033**
(0.017)

1364
137

1.188***
(0.009)
0.335***
(0.012)
0.279***
(0.024)
-0.039***
(0.003)
0.353***
(0.095)
0.219***
(0.005)
4.362***
(0.277)
0.716
0.000

-0.267***
(0.025)

Tourist Arrivals

1364
137

1.123***
(0.013)
0.406***
(0.020)
0.444***
(0.021)
-0.050***
(0.003)
0.277**
(0.127)
0.218***
(0.004)
1.862***
(0.282)
0.702
0.000

0.034**
(0.015)

-0.266***
(0.021)
-0.118***
(0.011)

-0.304***
(0.020)

Tourism Revenue

-0.058***
(0.012)

1217
136

1364
137

1364
137

1217
136

1364
137

1364
137

1217
136

0.014
-0.063***
-0.006
(0.020)
(0.008)
(0.016)
1.165***
0.971***
0.871***
0.930***
(0.014)
(0.048)
(0.058)
(0.049)
0.369***
0.414***
0.441***
0.490***
(0.013)
(0.044)
(0.040)
(0.040)
0.323***
0.280***
0.331***
0.445
0.266***
0.383***
0.456***
(0.009)
(0.048)
(0.040)
(0.049)
(0.054)
(0.050)
(0.053)
-0.041*** -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.068*** -0.082*** -0.074***
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
-0.406
-0.298
-0.372
-0.390
-0.200
0.417*** -0.449*
(0.262)
(0.289)
(0.251)
(0.249)
(0.291)
(0.210)
(0.102)
0.225***
0.379***
0.375***
0.359***
0.309***
0.310***
0.289***
(0.004)
(0.264)
(0.028)
(0.028)
(0.032)
(0.034)
(0.034)
2.784***
3.984***
3.432***
1.732***
3.917***
2.308***
1.373***
(0.070)
(0.408)
(0.295)
(0.415)
(0.475)
(0.432)
(0.445)
0.706
0.646
0.642
0.635
0.689
0.678
0.680
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Note: Figures in parentheses are white heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.

Adjusted R2
Wald test
(p value)
Observations
Countries

Constant

ATT

CEXC

IEXC

GDPPC

N

H

TERROR

CORR

PI

Variable

Table 3
Effects of Political Instability on Tourism Using Panel Fixed Effects
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Table 4
Average Corruption Index and Growth in Tourism
Demand From 1999 to 2009 for Selected Countries
Selected
Countries
Turkey
Indonesia
Thailand
Czech Republic
Uganda
China
India
Switzerland
UK
Singapore
US

Average
Corruption Index

Average
Percentage Growth
in Tourist Arrivals

6.3
7.0
7.5
5.8
7.0
7.3
6.6
3.1
3.4
3.4
3.7

14.7
3.3
5.1
3.9
17.6
6.0
7.9
1.2
1.9
4.4
1.5

Note: For corruption index, a country that has the lowest
(highest) level of corruption would have a low (high) score.
The index ranges between 1 and 10. Sources: PRS Group
and Euromonitor.

fall; nevertheless, there is a possibility that it can
decrease tourism revenue. This result is consistent
with countries like China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey. Corruption index in these countries reflects a high level of corruption; however,
the numbers of tourist arrivals to these countries are
growing over time (see Table 4).
The coefficient for TERROR is negative and significant only when TA is the dependent variable.
A one-unit increase in terrorists’ activity decreases
tourist arrivals by 4–7%. On the other hand, the
impact of terrorist attacks on tourism revenue is
positive, although not significant, suggesting that

terrorist attack may attract international as well
as domestic tourists to witness the destruction or
rebuild activity after terrorist attacks. The September
11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New
York City provides a good example of this positive effect. Now, when tourists visit New York City,
they are also tempted to visit the reconstruction of
Twin Towers.
The coefficients of H and N are positive and
highly significant in all estimations, indicating that
historical and natural heritage promote the tourism
industry. Moreover, the control variables are significant and expected in signs with a few exceptions.
A high level of per capita income and tourist attractions encourage the tourism demand of a country,
whereas depreciation of currency promotes tourism. A low level of initial exchange rate attracts
more tourists to a country due to cheaper currency.
Overall, political instability reduces tourism
demand substantially. The magnitude of the effect
on tourism revenue is stronger compared to the
tourist arrivals (Table 5). The stronger effect may be
due to tourism revenue consisting of both international and domestic tourists, whereas tourist arrivals contain only the international tourists. Control
variables are all significant and expected in sign.
Political instability, terrorism, and corruption with
heritage dummy variables and control variables
can explain around 62% to 72% of the variation
in tourism demand (see Table 3). The implication
of the results suggests that where political instability or terrorist attacks occur, it is a simple choice
for the tourists to switch their travel destination to
where there is a lower or no risk at all. The results

Table 5
Impact of Political Instability, Terrorism, and Corruption on Tourism Demand
Percentage Change in Tourist Arrivals
No heritage
Heritage
PI
CORR
TERROR

-24%
-3%
-4%

-31%
+4%
-7%

Percentage Change in Tourism Revenue
No heritage
Heritage

-30%
-13%
+1%

-36%
-6%
-1%

Note: The figures shown are based on anti-natural logarithm of the coefficients from Table 3 minus one. For instance, in Table 3,
the regression for tourist arrival model without heritage dummy variables is ln(TA) = 4.212 – 0.214PI + 0.314GDPPC – 0.059
IEXC + 0.238CEXC + 0.292ATT. To measure the exp(0.214) – 1 = 0.24 percentage change in TA when PI changes by one unit,
it can be calculated as: exp(0.214) – 1 = 0.24 or 24%.
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magnitudes of their effects are considerable. The
negative effect varies from 1% to 36% on the tourism revenue, for example. Corruption shows some
interesting effects, indicating that corruption might
not reduce tourism demand in a country if it is classified as UNESCO’s historical and natural heritage.
Historical and natural heritage play crucial roles in
attracting tourists to a country. However, even in
the presence of heritage, political instability causes
severe damage to the industry and the effects are
stronger in comparison to terrorist attacks. Both
causality (mediator) and interaction (moderator)
effects show that heritage plays a vital role in promoting tourism industry even though there are various risks present in a country.
The policy implications of the study are twofold.
First, for those countries that constantly face political uncertainty, tourism officials must put more
emphasis on tourism crisis management to maintain
confidence in tourists’ security and to protect the
countries’ iconic treasures. Sönmez, Apotolopoulos,
and Tarlow (1999) asserted that even though
unpredictable terrorism acts and social unrest could
happen anytime, destinations still need to be prepared with an action plan for recovery marketing
strategies and fund-raising activities to conserve
perishable tourism products. Second, the study
estimated the losses of tourism revenue if countries
experience political upheavals and terrorism. The
estimations are robust after using several indicators,
specifications, and estimation techniques. In the context of tourism demand modeling, it is important to
include political instability, terrorism, and corruption variables as well as destinations’ heritage indicators, so that forecasts about tourist arrivals and
tourism revenues can be more accurate, which are
vital to implementing effective plans for hotel and
tourism development.

also indicate that the deterring effect of political
instability on tourism demand is far greater than
the impact of terrorism and corruption. In addition,
Table 3 reflects that historical and natural heritage
attract more tourists and generate high tourism revenue in a country, but if there is political instability,
then deterring effects are far greater compared to
the countries that do not have any heritage.
Finally, after incorporating the interaction term,
the sign of political risk variables remains the
same; that is, high political risk causes damage to
the tourism industry. The interaction term shows a
positive sign with a few exceptions. The findings
indicate that heritage plays an important role in
attracting tourists. The marginal impact of PI on
ln(TA) in historical heritage countries, for example,
is -0.263 + (-0.063 ´ 1) = -1.086 (refer to Table 6).
That is, a one-unit rise in PI leads to a fall in ln(TA)
coefficient by approximately 1.1. Outside heritage,
a one-unit rise in PI leads to a fall in ln(TA) coefficient by approximately 0.1. The marginal impacts
are greater for historical heritage countries, which
is consistent with our mediator effect results. However, for TERROR and CORR the marginal impacts
are a little smaller in heritage destinations.
Conclusion
This article examines the performance of the
tourism industry in terms of tourist arrivals and
tourism revenue in the presence of political instability, corruption, and terrorism for 139 countries
for the period 1999–2009 using panel fixed-effects
estimation techniques. The results show that political instability seems to have an adverse effect on
tourism industry. In other words, ceteris paribus,
political instability, corruption, and terrorism
have negative effects on tourism demand and the

Table 6
Marginal Impacts (MIs) of Political Instability on Tourism for UNESCO’s Heritage Countries
ln(TA) when H = 1
d1
d3
MI
PI
CORR
TERROR

-0.263
-0.017
-0.072

-0.063
+0.073
+0.007

-1.086
+0.056
-0.065

ln(TA) when N = 1
d1
d3
MI
-0.122
-0.033
-0.075

-0.172
+0.062
+0.097

-0.294
+0.029
+0.022

ln(TR) when H = 1
d1
d3
MI
-0.364
-0.130
-0.021

+0.105
+0.126
+0.018

-0.259
-0.004
-0.003

ln(TR) when N = 1
d1
d3
MI
-0.259
-0.175
-0.082

+0.080
+0.148
+0.211

-0.193
-0.027
+0.129

Note: Due to space limitation, we do not report the coefficients for other variables. However, we can provide them upon request.
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This study does not come without a limitation.
The current research focused on past tourism data
and not on potential tourists who intend to travel. As
suggested by Hem, Iversen, and Nysveen (2002),
destination images (i.e., advertisement photos) that
portray a risky vacation situation could generally
create negative effects on tourists’ intention to visit
a destination. Hence, for future research, it would
be interesting to investigate how a destination’s
images of political risk, terrorist attacks, and corruption could influence potential tourists’ intention to visit. It would not only explain the behavior
and attitude of tourists’ reactions to a destination’s

negative images, but it could also provide important information about the actual effects of political risk and corruption on future tourists. However,
such research requires qualitative research methods
that are beyond the scope of this study.
Notes
1
Neumayer (2004) employed internal and external conflicts variables as the proxies for political instability, and real
effective exchange rate as the economics variable.
2
Note that the original scores provided by the PRS group
interpret their political risk data as high (low) scores mean low
(high) risks. For the ease of explanation, we rescale the PRS’s
score points, where high (low) scores mean high (low) risks.

Appendix
Descriptive Statistics of Tourism Demand and Political Instability Variables, 1999–2009
LTA
Mean
7.16
Median
7.17
Max
11.30
Min
1.74
SD
1.92
Skewness -0.25
Kurtosis
2.63
JarqueBera
23.85
Prob (JB)
0.00

LTR

PI

GS

IC

6.68
6.83
11.86
-13.82
2.35
-1.94
16.93

3.33
3.08
7.15
1.28
1.12
0.86
3.43

3.46
3.34
7.63
1.38
1.15
0.36
2.59

2.73
2.69
7.33
1
1.18
0.99
4.13

13316.13
0.00

159
0.00

35.4
0.00

266
0.00

EC

ET

MP

RP

2.50
2.25
8.41
1
1.11
1.42
5.94

4.02
4
10
1
1.92
0.38
2.36

4.13
4
10
1
2.57
0.53
2.30

3.13
2.50
10
1
1.94
1.03
3.47

846
0.00

49.8
0.00

81.6 228
0.00
0.00

Terror
3.36
3.25
10
1
1.94
0.69
2.99
96.6
0.000

Corr
6.13
6.38
10
1
1.77
-0.83
3.26

EXC
375.26
5.16
40290
0.20
2178.87
14.61
251.95

144.4
3185980
0.000
0.000

Panel unit root test (null hypothesis: panel series is nonstationary)
LLC t
-9.126 -67
-23
-380
-447
-66
-48
-41
-1437
-641.7
statisticsa -7.335
Prob
(LLC)
0.000
0.000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.000
0.000

-8.33
0.000

LGDPPC

LATT

8.76
8.93
11.84
5.09
1.38
-0.38
2.32

3.45
3.82
11.42
-13.82
3.69
-2.39
12.54

65.86
0.00

7254.06
0.00

-4.79

-8.59

0.000

0.000

Note: LTA, natural logarithm of tourist arrivals; LTR, natural logarithm of tourism receipts; PI, composite of political instability;
GS, government instability; IC, internal conflicts; EC, external conflicts; ET, ethics tension; MP, military in politics; RP, religion
in politics; TERR, terrorism; CORR, corruption; EXC, real exchange rate (adjusted by PPP); LGDPPC, natural logarithm of
gross domestic product per capita (adjusted by PPP); LATT, natural logarithm of tourist attraction.
a
LLC t statistics are based on the panel unit root tests.
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